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ABSTRACT 
We provide a theory to explain the data generated by Double Oral 
Auctions. The primary conclusion suggested by Double Oral Auction 
experiments is that the quantities exchanged and the prices at which 
transactions take place converge to, or near to, the values predicted 
by the competitive equilibrium model. Our theory predicts convergence 
to the competitive equilibrium and provides an explanation of 
disequilibrium behavior. The predictions of our theory fit the data 
better than do the predictions of Walrasian, Marshallian or game 
theoretic models. 
THEORIES OF PRICE FORMATION AND EXCHANGE IN DOUBLE ORAL AUCTIONS 
David Easley and John Ledyard* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main j ustifications for the use of equilibrium models in 
economics is the argument that there are forces which tend to drive 
agents and their decisions towards an equilihrium, if they are not at 
one already. Market equilibrium models have proven to be extremely 
powerful in the analysis of many situations; however, attempts to model 
and explain the forces that do drive an economy to equilibrium have met 
with little success. Most of the literature on the stability of 
equilibrium uses the fiction of a disinterested auctioneer who adjusts 
a single known price for each good in response to stated excess demand 
resulting from agents' equilibrium plans. The limitations and defects 
of this approach are well-known; for a survey of the literature see 
Arrow and Hahn [l]. In addition, as far as we know, the only 
institutional arrangement that even approximates this idealized model 
of price formation is the London gold market (see Jarecki [5]). 
Now, however, a body of data has been generated which provides 
detailed information on the disequilibrium behavior of traders in 
auction markets similar to those of organized commodity or stock 
exchanges. These data are difficult to ignore since they are generated 
experimentally under controlled conditions, and cannot be explained 
away by reference to measurement error, unobserved variables, or other 
fudge factors. In the experiment, a small number of traders, each with 
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limited imperfect information, determine prices and quantities 
transacted through interactive bargains. There is neither a single 
price nor a single price quoter. Nonetheless, the quantities exchanged 
and the prices at which transactions take place typically converge to, 
or near to, the values predicted by the competitive equilibrium model. 
In spite of the fact that the traditional demand-supply model appears 
to yield reasonably accurate predictions of the long- run average prices 
and quantities in these markets, it fails to yield any insights into 
the process by which these prices and quantities are obtained. 
In this paper we consider several positive theories of the price 
formation and exchange process for the class of experimental exchange 
markets called Double Oral Auctions. 1 We examine three of these
theories in detail and argue that one of them seems to be the most 
consistent with the data. The ability of this theory also to explain 
price formation and exchange in other markets such as the New York 
Stock Exchange depends, of course, on the degree of parallelism that 
exists between the two (see Smith [11]). An astronomer's maintained 
hypothesis is that the physics of the lab is the same as that of the 
sun; our working hypothesis is that behavior in experimental markets is 
similar to that in other markets, and that insights discovered in the 
evidence generated in the lab are potentially transferable to 
non-experimental markets with similar institutional structures. Thus, 
we view the theory in this paper as a first step towards constructing a 
positive theory of the process of exchange and price formation in many 
other markets. 
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2. THE EXPERIMENTAL MARKET 
In a Double Oral Auction (DOA) experiment, a pool of subj ects
(usually eight to twelve) is divided at random into a group of buyers 
and a group of sellers. The buyers are given value schedules telling 
them the amount in cents that they will receive from the experimenter 
for each unit of the good they purchase. Buyers keep the difference 
between their value and price they pay for that unit. The sellers are 
given cost schedules telling them their cost in cents for each unit of 
the good they sell. Sellers keep the difference between their selling 
price and their cost on each unit they sell. Each subject knows his 
own payoff schedule, but is given no information about the others' 
payoffs. Smith [9] shows how these payoff schedules induce demand and
supply schedules. An example of the induced supply and demand 
schedules for one experiment is provided in Appendix A. A description 
of this experiment, including the instructions given to subjects, and 
their payoff schedules is provided in Appendix B. 
After they receive their payoff schedules, subjects are allowed to 
trade during a market period of some fixed length. Buyers can make 
bids to buy a unit of the good and sellers can make offers to sell a 
unit. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding trade occurs and all 
traders are informed of the contract price. Once a trade is completed, 
bids and offers can be made for another unit of the good. No 
information other than bids, offers, acceptances, and contract prices 
is transmitted or known by the participants. 
When a market period ends, the subj ects are given new payoff 
schedules, identical to their schedules for the previous period, and 
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the experiment is repeated.2 Market demand and supply conditions are
typically held constant across periods so that any equilibrating 
process that exists has a chance to establish an equilibrium. For a 
more detailed explanation of auction experiments and the usual results 
see Williams (14] and Smith and Williams (13] . 
These experiments provide a unique opportunity to examine price 
formation for two reasons. The first is that, unlike non-experimental 
markets, the actual competitive equilibrium prices and quantities are 
known. Second, complete data on bids, offers, contracts, and their 
timing is available. An example of a typical design and the data 
generated is provided in Appendices A and B. Demand and supply 
functions can be calculated from the subjects' valuations, and 
competitive equilibrium prices and quantities can then be computed. 
The first obvious fact from these experiments is that actual exchange 
prices are not equal to those predicted by the competitive model. In a 
strict sense, demand-supply theory is rejected by these data. The 
second obvious fac.t, however, is that after a very few replications, 
transaction prices and quantities converge to near those predicted by 
the competitive model. These observations have been replicated many 
times.3 The only conclusion one can draw is that the traditional
theory needs refining before one has a compelling explanation of the 
observed behavior in these markets. Not only must " equilibrium" be 
explained, but we must also explain the "disequilibrium" values, the 
sequence in which they occur, and the process by which participants are 
11learning." 
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The methodology we use to evaluate alternative theories of price 
adjustment consists of three steps. First, a good theory must predict 
convergence of quantities transacted and the prices at which 
transactions take place to the values predicted by the competitive 
equilibrium model. Any theory that fails this test will be at odds 
with the data and will be a poor theory of price adjustment. Second , 
the subset of theories which pass the first test are evaluated 
according to the frequency of violation of their predictions of 
disequilibrium data. A good theory must not predict disequilibrium 
behavior that is substantially at odds with the data. Those theories 
which predict convergence to competitive equilibrium , but whose 
predictions about the disequilibrium sequence are inconsistent with 
data are rejected. Third, those theories which pass the above tests 
are ranked according to the precision of their predictions. Better 
theories yield more precise predictions about bids, offers and 
contracts. 
3. TWO POSSIBLE THEORIES
Our goal is to understand how the actual dynamics of these markets
work, not how they should work. We recognize that there are a variety 
of models which purport to explain price adjustments, but we view the 
existence of experimental data as an opportunity to reject the subset 
of those theories which are obviously incorrect. The set of reasonable 
theories for these markets can now be constrained by the data in a way 
that has been unusual for economics but common in other sciences. To 
see what this means let us consider two obvious candidates for a theory 
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of market dynamics. 
Since both the institutional description and the data from the 
experimental DOA markets reject the Walrasian tatonnement auctioneer as 
the appropriate model of price formation , a natural alternative might 
be a Marshallian theory. In a naive version of this theory , the 
trading sequence depends on the differences in buyers' prices 
(willingness to pay) and sellers' prices. In particular, this theory 
predicts that the first trade will occur between the buyer with the 
highest induced value (Buyer 1 in the example in Appendix A) and the 
seller with the lowest induced cost (Seller 1 in the example in 
Appendix A). The second trade occurs between the buyer and seller with 
the second values and costs , and so on. This theory does not predict 
which prices will occur, but it does predict that the total quantity 
transacted will be the competitive equilibrium quantity. When we look 
closely at the microdata we see that the theory is soundly rej ected. A 
cursory glance at the summary data of Appendix B should convince even 
the most skeptical reader that the predictions of the naive Marshallian 
theory are not at all consistent with the data. (In IPDA14 , the rank 
correlation coefficient between the order of the true values and the 
order of the transactions is . 369 in week 1 and . 273 in week 2.) This 
is an excellent example of a case in which the experimental setup 
allows us to test more hypotheses than would be possible if we only had 
access to non-experimental market data. Testing the prediction 
concerning the order in which participants are involved in transactions 
would be impossible without explicit knowledge of the individual 
valuations. 
6 
A second candidate for a theory might be a model based on game 
theoretic considerations. For most of the DOA markets there is a Nash 
equilibrium (with price- quantity offers or bids as strategies) in which 
all trades take place at the competitive equilibrium price. However , 
the use of a Nash equilibrium concept to describe the experimental 
market has two difficulties. First, as Appendix B illustrates , the 
data are not consistent with this equilibrium. Second, the 
participants in the experiments do not have enough information to 
calculate the strategies required to support this equilibrium. (They 
would have to be able to calculate the competitive equilibrium price. ) 
Thus , we must consider a further complication. 
In the experiments which have been run , details on others' payoffs 
(and thus on the competitive equilibrium) may only be inferred by the 
subjects from the public data on bids, offers and contracts. Thus, the 
structure in which subjects find themselves is a repeated game with 
incomplete information. If an equilibrium were calculated for this 
game its predictions could then be compared with the data. We feel 
that there are at least three reasons why this approach would be 
inadequate as a positive theory of Double Oral Auctions. First, as 
common knowledge about the distribution of valuations and the 
strategies selected is not controlled for in the experiments it is not 
clear how to apply game theory, as it currently exists , to the 
experiments. One could try to ignore this problem and assume that 
there is , at some level, common knowledge. However, this leads to a 
second difficulty. 
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If the subjects are risk neutral, we know from Gresik and 
Satterthwaite [3] and the revelation principle that any Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium has the property that no extra-marginal units are traded 
when subjects only own one unit of the commodity. Yet in the 
experiments extra-marginal units are often traded (see, e. g. , the data 
from IPDA14 in Appendix B). If the subjects are risk averse then we 
know from Ledyard [6] that virtually anything can be an equilibrium. 
If risk attitudes are not controlled for (see Roth and Malouf [9]) then 
the game theoretic model explains everything. 
Our third difficulty with the game theoretic approach is that, as 
far as we know, no one has solved for an equilibrium of the appropriate 
game. Wilson [15] has found strategies for a non-repeated version of 
the DOA which satisfy the necessary conditions for a Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. But the DOAs are repeated, common knowledge is not 
controlled for and subjects may not be risk neutral as Wilson assumes. 
Under these circumstances, it is not fair to compare Wilson's 
predictions with the data. Wilson's model predicts that the rank 
correlation coefficient between the order of true values and trades is 
one which, as we noted above, is strongly at odds with the data. Thus, 
at least one of repetition, common knowledge, or risk attitudes seem to 
be crucial. 
Friedman [2] takes an alternative game theoretic approach to the 
problem by redefining the game. He studies one day of a DOA with 
traders who are allowed to resell or repurchase the good being traded. 
Under a no-congestion condition which requires that at the day ' s end no 
trader wants to reset the closing bid or ask prices or accept the 
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outstanding bid or ask, he shows that the final allocation is at most 
one transaction away from being Pareto-optimal. No-congestion implies 
that the final ask be no more than the second lowest cost of selling a 
unit, the final bid be no less than the second highest value of buying 
a unit, and that no one wants to accept the final prices. With resale 
and repurchase allowed this insures that all but perhaps one 
infra- marginal unit has traded and that no more than one extra-marginal 
unit has traded. Beyond the question of the appropriateness of the 
no-congestion assumption, the difficulty in applying this theory to the 
DOA experiments is that the theoretical conclus�on relies heavily on
the agents' ability to retrade, while retrading is not allowed in the 
experiments. 
Since neither a Marshallian nor a game theoretic model appears to 
be appropriate as a positive theory we must develop an alternative 
theory. 
4. A POSITIVE THEORY
a. Preliminaries
A participant in a Double Oral Auction experiment has a complex
decision problem. He must decide when to bid, how much to bid, and 
whether or not to accept the trades offered by other subjects. 
Further, all of these decisions must be made with very imperfect 
information. The subj ect does not know the payoffs or expectations of 
other agents , he does not know the terms of trade that will be 
available to him in the future, and he does not know the effect of his 
actions on the actions of others. This is a very complex interactive 
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decision problem with incomplete information in which individuals must 
choose bidding and acceptance strategies. To place some structure on 
this problem, we first introduce some notation and definitions 
concerning the data known to both the experimenter and us. 
The true payoffs or values given to buyers are integers, and are 
ranked as v1 � vz � � vn � 0, where vi is the ith highest value 
and there are n units. A buyer b will be assigned a subset of these 
units vb1 � vb2 � 
sequence bl, b2, . 
� vbB and will trade them one at a time in the 
bB. No recontracting is allowed. The true 
costs given to sellers are integers , and are ranked as 0 � M1 � M2 � 
�Mm. where Mj is the cost of the j th unit and there are m units. 
It should be noted that in all of the hundred or so experimental double 
oral auction markets that we know of the values, vi, and costs, Mi , are 
assigned once and remain fixed across a number of days. Each buyer 
(seller) knows only his own values (costs) and no participant is given 
any information as to how these values and costs were chosen. There is 
no basis for common knowledge assumptions about independence of values 
or their distributions. Consequently we neither make such assumptions 
nor use these concepts in our theory. 
Harket periods or days for an experiment are indexed by d � 1, 2,
The time remaining in any given day is indexed by t � 0, 1, 
T. Contract prices , bids, and offers are in integer units in the 
interval [O , P] ,  where P < oo is some arbitrarily selected upper bound 
above v1 and Mm, and during any particular day , d, each participant 
observes all contract prices, bids , and offers.4 
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To summarize, each buyer knows the rules of the auction; the value 
of his own units; as well as the sequence , timing , amount, and identity 
of all past bids, offers, and contracts. It is these data alone on 
which the buyer can base his decisions to bid and to accept. A 
symmetric remark applies to each seller. 
b. An Intuitive Look
We adopt the spirit of both revealed preference theory and
demand- supply analysis by placing assumptions on individual behavior, 
which we believe are consistant not only with optimal behavior but also 
with a vast range of " boundedly rational" rules of thumb. We do not 
model how agents should make their decisions. Instead , we provide 
criteria which we believe sensible individuals in these markets act as 
if they satisfy. We do this by decomposing the decision problem into 
three main elements; expectations, reservation prices, and bidding 
strategies. These are most easily explained in reverse order. 
Assume that at each instant of time there is for each buyer 
(seller) a reservation price , possibly different from his true value, 
which summarizes his willingness to bid up (offer down) to that price 
or to accept any offer up (bid down) to that price. 5 If each
participant has such a reservation price as a function of time, the 
auction can then be thought of as proceeding like an English auction , 
with these reservation prices substituting for the true values. After 
some period of time the outstanding bid will always be held by the 
buyer with the highest reservation price (not necessarily the highest 
untraded value) , and that bid will be at least as high as the second 
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highest reservation price. Otherwise, the holder of the second highest 
reservation price will bid , causing the holder of the highest 
reservation price to rebid , and so on. We find it unnecessary to 
explicity model this process , and we assume that it occurs 
instantaneously. Thus , all observed bids will be the reduced form 
results of the above English auction. This intuitive view of the 
bidding is formalized in Assumption 1 below. Sellers' offers are 
viewed symmetrically in Assumption l'. 
Since bids and offers depend on reservation prices, they ultimately 
depend on the relationship between reservation prices and the data 
observed by each agent. This relationship is assumed to depend on two 
principles of learning. First , it is true that whenever the bids and 
acceptance prices of a buyer are higher than were necessary to complete 
a transaction , the buyer completes a trade but overpays. We assume 
that a buyer will realize that he overpaid and will, during the next 
auction, lower his reservation price. If it is not lowered too much 
the buyer should still be able to complete a transaction but at a 
better price. Second, it is true that if a buyer waits too long to bid 
or, what is the same thing, maintains too low a reservation price 
during the day , then that buyer may not complete a transaction even 
though profitable ones are available. We assume that if a buyer could 
have purchased a unit at less than its value to him , vi, but did not, 
then that buyer will realize he underbid and will , either that day or 
during the next auction, raise his reservation price at each time of 
day. It is the delicate balance between "paying too much" and "not 
offering to pay enough" which the buyers must learn in order to be 
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successful in the auction. We do not explicitly model this learning 
process; instead, we provide assumptions about reservation price 
behavior which , if satisfied, reflect these learning principles. We 
summarize this rather simple intuition in Assumption 2 below. 
c. Bidding Behavior
We start our description of the formal theory with the introduction
of a hypothesis concerning the existence of the key unobservable of our 
model. It is important to realize that we treat reservation prices in 
this paper in the way that preferences are generally treated in 
economics. We cannot observe whether subjects really compute 
reservation prices; we can only assume they act as if they do. For a 
coherent theory , the reservation prices may need to be related in a 
systematic way to the true values but, a priori, do not need to be. 
Assumption 0: Reservation Prices 
For each buyer unit and seller unit there is an (unobservable) 
reservation price at each day d and time t ,  denoted rb(t) • R1 for 
buyers and s�(t) • R1 for sellers. 
Assumption 0 only contains notation. To link the unobservable 
reservation prices to the data , we need to tie the bids and acceptances 
to them , and then to tie reservation prices to the true values and 
costs. As we indicated in the previous section , this is done by 
assuming that, given reservation prices , bids and acceptances are the 
reduced form of English auction behavior. 
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Assumption 1: Buyers' Bids and Acceptances 
i) bd(t) , the current outstanding bid in day d, with time t
left, is held by buyer i* where rb*(t) � r�(t), for all
i - 1, ' n.
ii) bd(t),;;r�*(t).
iii) bd(t) � r�(t), for all i � i*.
iv) Buyer i* accepts the current outstanding offer , od(t), if
and only if od(t) :'5 rb*(t). No other i accepts od(t).
Simply stated, at each point in time, the current bid is held by 
the buyer with the highest reservation price- - not necessarily the buyer 
with the highest true value. This bid lies below that reservation 
price and above the second highest reservation price. Under Assumption 
1, and l' below, trades always occur between the buyer with the highest 
reservation price and the seller with the lowest reservation price. We 
emphasize that these need not be the buyer with the highest value and
the seller with the lowest cost since the English auction is based on 
reservation prices and not on the "true values , "  vi and Mi . 
For completeness , we make an assumption on the offers and 
acceptances of sellers that is symmetric with that made for buyers. 
The only difference is that we have arbitrarily assumed that if seller 
j* is willing to accept bd(t) and buyer i* is willing to accept od(t) 
then the buyer accepts first. 
Assumption l': Sellers' Offers and Acceptances 
i) od(t), the current outstanding offer in day d, with time t 
* . * . left, is held by seller j where sb (t),;; sb(t), for all 
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j - 1, . . .  m. 
ii) od(t);>:: s�*(t).
iii) · od (t) :S s� (t) , for all j "" j*. 
iv) seller j* accepts the outstanding bid bd(t) if and only if
bd(t) ;>:: s�*(t) and i* does not accept od(t). No other j
accepts bd(t).
We do not yet have a testable theory since , given any sequence of 
bids and contracts, it is possible to construct a sequence of 
reservation prices which , under Assumption 1, would imply the given 
data precisely. Unless we place some restrictions on the reservation 
prices, we can explain anything, and therefore nothing. 
d. Reservation Price Formation
We now tie the theory down by restricting reservation price
behavior in a way which relates it to observable data. This is the way 
in which we connect bids , contract prices, and the sequence of trades 
to the initial data known by the experimenter and, thus , provide 
testable propositions about these auctions. 
Reservation prices are assumed to be formed in accordance with the 
intuitive principles outlined in Section 4. b. We begin by assuming 
that a buyer's expectations in any period are based on the prices of 
last period. In particular, we assume that the support of the buyer's 
expectations is the set of prices bounded by the maximum of last 
period's highest contract price or highest bid , and the minimum of last 
period's lowest contract price or lowest offer. Based on these 
expectations, reservation prices are formed over time as follows: (a) 
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for most of a trading day , one's reservation price lies below vi and 
within the support of the expectations (when this is feasible) , (b) if 
possible , the reservation price is actually below the maximum price in 
the support since the buyer does not want to "overpay , "  (c) eventually , 
if no contract is agreed to , buyers will cave-in and let the 
reservation price approach the maximum price in the support, and (d) if 
still no contract is completed, the reservation price will rise higher 
than even the maximum in the support of the expectations. This 
sequence of actions includes behavior known to be optimal in finite 
time stochastic search models and should , therefore , be uncontroversial. 
Before formalizing our assumption on reservation prices we need to 
introduce some notation. If a trade occurs at time t of day d we let 
cd(t) be the contract price. Then for each day d > 1, let fd -
Min(od_1(t), cd_,(t) t-0 , , T) and Pd Max(bd _ 1 (t), cd _ 1 (t)
t - 0 ,  , T). We assign [!'.1, P1] - [O, P]. The interval [!'.d,
Pd] is interpreted as the support of traders' price expectations in day 
d. Let LIPd pd - !'.d.
Assumption 2: Buyer's Reservation Price Formation 
For all buyers i - 1, . . .  , n: 
i) If i has traded (accepted an offer or had a bid accepted) in 
day d before time t then r� ( t) 0 .
ii) For each day d there is time tb > 1 such that, if i has not
traded in d before t ,  then:
a) For all t > tb;
Min(Vi , Pd)> rb(t) ;>:: Min(Vi, !'.dl if LIPd > 1 and vi ;>:: fd, 
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Min(Vi , Pd} � r�(t) �Min(Vi , !'.dl otherwise. 
b) r�(t�) -Min{V;, Pd - 1). 
c) For all t < t�;
r�(t) -Min (Vi, bd(t - 1) + 1) if
bd(t - 1) < (Pd, Pd - 1) and bd(t - 1) unaccepted , 
r�(t) < (r�(t - 1), Min {Vi, bd(t - 1) + 1)) if 
bd (t - 1) > Pd and bd (t - 1) unaccepted , 
r�(t) - r�(t - 1) �therwise. 
Assumption 2(i) sets the reservation price for traded units to zero to 
indicate that they have left the market. The conditions in assumptions 
2(ii)(a) embody the intuition that, as a result of learning , 
reservation prices will not be "too high" early in the trading day. 
The conditions in assumption 2(ii)(b) and 2(ii)(c) embody the intuition 
that , towards the end of the day, if the buyer has not completed a 
transaction then that buyer will learn to raise his reservation price 
slowly. Towards the end of the day, reservation prices will not be 
11too low. " 
To complete the model we make a symmetric assumption about sellers' 
reservation prices which we call Assumption 2'. 
Assumption 2': Sellers Reservation Price Formation 
For all sellers j -1, . . .  , m: 
i) If j has traded (accepted a bid or had an offer accepted) in
day d before time t then s�(t) -P.
ii) For each day d there is a time t� > 1 such that, if
traded in day d before time t, then:
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has not 
a) For all t > t�;
b) 
Max{Mi, Pd} � s�(t) > Max{Mi , fd} if 6Pd > 1 and Mi � Pd ,
Max{Mi , Pu} � s� (t) � Max{Mi , fd} otherwise.
s�(th) -Max(Mi , !'.d + 1). 
c) For all t < t�;
s�(t) - Max{Mj , od(t - 1) - 1) if
od(t - 1) < (fd ,  !'.d + 1) and od(t - 1) unaccepted , 
s�(t) < {s�(t - 1), Max (Mi ,  od(t - 1) - 1)) if 
od(t - 1) < fd and od(t - 1) unaccepted 
s�(t) -s�(t 1) otherwise. 
We have made two implicit assumptions which should be recognized. 
First , we assume that each buyer's and seller's behavior is independent 
of the total number of participants in the market. That is , a buyer's 
choices of bids and acceptances is the same whether he is a monopolist 
or one of 100 buyers. Although this runs counter to conventional 
economics , experimental evidence suggests that if the number of buyers 
and the number of sellers are both greater than two then this 
assumption is satisfied. Further , even if there is a single seller, 
what little evidence there is suggests that the model we propose may 
still be appropriate. We leave as an open empirical question just how 
few participants , if any, are needed before our theory is not 
applicable. 
The second implicit assumption is that buyers and sellers with 
multiple units to purchase or sell will decide on strategies for each 
unit separately. That is , the bids and acceptances a buyer makes for 
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his, say, highest valued (first) unit are assumed to be independent of 
the total number of units he may want to buy. This is not "rational 
behavior" but the interaction effects are difficult to model (we know 
of no literature which does this). The simplicity this assumption 
gives the theory is, we feel, well worth the price.6 
A question that naturally arises is whether our behavioral rules 
are consistent with optimal behavior for a game theoretic formulation 
of the DOA. Since we have not modeled the repeated incomplete 
information game, and since the common knowledge assumptions that are 
an integral part of game theory are not controlled for in the 
experiments, there is no one correct model of the game actually being 
played. So we have no formal way to address the optimality of our 
behavioral rules. However, we know from Ledyard [6] that the 
implications of our rules for the observable data on trades are 
consistent with the implications of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the 
repeated incomplete information game for some specification of the 
traders' levels of risk aversion and common knowledge. So our 
behavioral rules are not necessarily inconsistent with optimal behavior . 
We believe that there are traders in the experiments whose behavior 
is, at least for a few iterations, vastly different from the behavior 
which would be consistent with our assumptions. In particular there 
are traders, such as seller 2 in IPDA57 (see Section 6) who continually 
hold out for a highly profitable trade even though they never complete 
one. These traders usually modify their behavior after a few 
iterations . Those who don't lose a considerable amount of 
11 opportunity11 income. We can't 11 explain11 this "irrationality," but 
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neither can any other sensible theory. 
We turn now to the derivation of a number of testable implications 
of the theory. We then confront these with the data from a small 
number of representative experiments. At that point, the reader should 
be able to decide whether or not our model offers a realistic 
description of actual behavior in double auctions . 7  
5. THEOREMS 
In this section we trace through some of the implications of our 
theory. As will become apparent, most of the action will occur when 
there is an "excess demand or supply" of two or more units remaining in 
the auction, as then there are competitive pressures on bids and 
offers. Thus we are interested in the following concepts. 
Definition: Let DC(P) � #{Vi � Pl, D0(P) � #{Vi >Pl, sc(P) - # [ Mi � 
Pl and s0(P) - #(Mi <Pl. Let P* - min(P: Dc(P) � S0(P) - 21 and p* 
max(P: Sc(P) � D0(P) 21. 
To see the role of P* and p* we consider the following 
propositions. All results are stated under Assumptions 0 ,  1, l' 2 ,  and 
2' . 
Lemma l: 
a) If fd � P* then fd+1 < fd· 
- * -b) If Pd � P then Pd +1 > Pd . 
If fd < P* then fd+l < P*. 
- * - * If Pd > P then Pd+l > P 
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Proof of Lemma 1: 
We prove (a); the proof of (b) is symmetric. 
Suppose fd � P* and !'.c!+1 � fd· As fd � P* we have nc(fd) 5 S0(fd) 
2. The number of trades in day d is no more than nc(fd) as by 
hypothesis all trades have been at price fd or above. Thus at t - 2 
there are at least two sellers j and j' with Mi, Mi' < fd who have not 
yet traded. Then by applying Assumptions 2'(ii)(c) and l' repeatedly, 
we have od(O) 5 fd - 1. But then fd+1 < fd which contradicts fd+l � fd· 
Suppose fd < P* and !'.c!+1 � P*. Then all trades have been at 
prices at or above P*. A minor modification of the argument above then 
yields a contradiction. 
Thus there are competitive forces driving minimum contract prices 
below P* and keeping them below P*. These same forces drive maximum 
contract prices above P* and keep them above P*. There are also 
competitive pressures driving maximum prices down and minimum prices up. 
Lemma 2: Suppose 6Pd > 1. 
a) If n° (fd) � S0 (Pd) then fd+1 > fd. 
b) If s0 (Pd) � n° (fd) then Pd+1 < Pd. 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
We prove (a); the proof of (b) i::; ::;ymmetric. 
Suppose that n°(fd) � S0(Pd) and fd+l 5 fd· Then there exists a 
time t' such that either od(t') - fd+l or cd(t') - !'.c!+1 .  Since fd+1 5 
fd and 6Pd > 1 it follows from Assumption 2'(ii)(a), (c) that there 
exists a time t > t' such that od(t) - fd + 1 was not accepted. 
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Therefore, as 6Pd > 1 Assumption l(ii)(a) implies that all units vi > 
fd have been traded before time t. So the number of trades before time 
t is at least n°(fd) � S0(Pd). Then as Assumption 2'(ii)(a) implies 
that if 6Pd > 1 all Mi < Pd trade before any Mi � Pd we know that all 
Mi < Pd have been traded before time t. So all Mi 5 fd have been 
traded before time t. Then by Assumption 2', s�(t), od(t) > fd for all 
t 5 t and all j. This contradicts [od(t') - fd+1 5 fd or cd(t') - fd+1 
5 fd J. 
Finally, buyers' reluctance to pay too much and sellers' reluctance 
to accept too little eventually force minimum and maximum contract 
prices closer together. Of course, the difference between maximum and 
minimum contract prices does not necessarily decrease every day. In a 
day where there is excess demand at the upper bound P, prices may rise, 
but they will not go above the cost of unit n°(f). This occurs because 
units up to n°(f) trade first (if 6P > 1) and these can all be traded 
at prices no more than MD0(�). Thus the statistic that falls, or at 
least does not rise, in every period is the maximum of P and MD
0(�) . 
Definition: Let ud max(Pd, M00<�d)) and id minll'.ci, vs0(Pd) l. 
1emma 3 :  If 6Pd > 1 then ud+l 5 ud, id+l � id and 
lua+i . ed+i ! < ! ua id ! . 
Proof of Lemma 3 :  
There are two cases to consider: (1) S0(Pd) � n°(fd), and (2) 
D0(fd) � S0(Pd). We prove the lemma under case l; the proof under case 
2 is symmetric. 
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We first need to establish that if 6Pd > 1 and S0(Pd) � D0(fd) then 
1'd+1 � ,ed. 
�laim 1 :  If 6Pd > 1 and S0(Pd) � D0(fd) then fd+1 � id. 
Proof of Claim 1 :  Suppose that 6Pd > 1, S0(Pd) � D0(fd) and fd+1 < 
,ed· From the definition of fd+i we know that there is a time t' in day 
d such that od(t') - fd+1 or cd(t') = fd+1. Then as fd+1 <id 5 fd 
there must be a time t in day d such that od(t) =id was not accepted. 
This implies that all Vi � V50(Pd) have traded before time t. So the 
number of units traded before time t is at least S0(Pd). By Lemma 2(b) 
we have Pd+i <Pd. So the number of units traded in day d is no more 
than S0(Pd). Thus the number of units traded in day d, before time t, 
is S0(Pd). So all Mj <Pd have traded before time t. Then there does 
not exist a seller unit Mi 5 fd+i <id to offer od(t') - fd+1 or accept 
a contract at cd(t') = fd+i. This contradicts fd+1 <id. 
The proof of Lemma 3 follows directly from the claims below. 
glaim 2: If 6Pd > 1 and S0 (Pd) � D0 (fd) then id+i � id. 
Proof of Claim 2: By Lemma 2, Pd+i <Pd. So S0(Pd+1 ) 5 S0(Pd). This 
implies that V50(Pd+1) � V50(Pd). By Claim 1, fd+1 � id. Now id+1 = 
Min(fd+i, V50 
(Pd+1) l � Min(fd+i, v50 (Pd) l � ,ed. 
i;:laim 3: If 6Pd > 1 and S0 (Pd) � D0 (fd) then ud+1 < ud. 
!.'roof of Claim 3: By Lemma 2(b), Pd+1 <Pd and by Claim 1 ,  fd+1 � id 
Min(fd, V50(Pd)). Thus D0(fd+1 ) 5 Max(D0(fd), S0(Pd)} = S0(Pd). So
M00<�d+1 ) 5 M50(Pd) <Pd. Then ud+i = Max(Pd+1 • M00<�d+1)} <Pd 5 ud. 
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So ud+1 < ud. 
The forces embodied in Lemma's 1 ,  2, and 3 serve to drive contract 
prices together and into the interval [P*, P*]. If supply and demand 
balance at this point, prices will stay in this interval. 
Theorem 1 :  If oc(P*) - sc(P*) then there exists a day d* < oo such that 
p* 5 fd < P* and P* <Pd 5 P* for all d � d*. 
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 1 we need to show that 
the interval [P*, P*] is well defined. 
Claim 4: P* � P*. 
Proof of Claim 4: Suppose p* � P*. Then sc(P*) 5 D0(P*) - 2 and 
oc(P*) $ s0(P*) - 2. So DC(P*) + 2 $ s0(P*) $ sc(P*) s o0(P*) - 2. 
This implies Dc(P*) < D0(P*) which is false. 
Proof of Theorem 1 :  
A s  the price set, the integers i n  ( 0 ,  P], is finite, Lemma 1 
implies that there is finite day d such tfiat fd < P* and Pd > P* for 
all d � d. Then by Lemma 3 there is a finite day ct* � d such that [f�.
-* * * Pd] S (P , P*] and 6Pd s 1 .
We now prove the theorem by an induction argument. Suppose (fd, 
Pd] S [P*, P*] for some day d � d*. We need to show that this implies 
- * * (fd+1, Pd+1] S (P , P*]. Suppose not, say fd+1 < P . Then there is a 
time t' in day d such that od(t') < p* or cd(t') < P*. As p* S fd 
there is a time t � t' such that od(t) = p* was not accepted. As p* s 
fci this implies that all units vi � p* have traded before time t. So 
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the number of units traded is at least Dc(P*) - sc(P*). As P* � Pd 
this implies that all units Mj s P* have traded before time t. Then 
there is no. seller with a unit Mj < p* < P* to offer od ( t') < P* or to 
accept cd(t') < P*. The proof that Pd+l SP* is symmetric. 
By the induction argument above and Lemma 1, we have a day d* < ro 
such that p* s fd < P* and P* < Pd s P* for all d � d*. 
Theorem 1 applies to experiments which have a Walrasian equilibrium 
price pe and quantity qe. These experiments fall into three groups. 
First, if there are multiple units at the Walrasian equilibrium price 
(and if Dc(pe - 1) - sc(pe + 1) ) ,  then Theorem 1 predicts that prices 
will eventually remain within one cent of pe (as P* - pe + 1, p* - pe 
1 )  and that quantity traded will be at least qe - 1 and no more than 
the maximum of sc(p* + 1 )  and nc(p* - 1 ) . Second, if there is only one 
unit at the Walrasian equilibrium price and nc(P*) sc(P*), then 
Theorem 1 predicts that eventually the maximum price will be 
no more than one cent above the minimum of the value of the first 
infra - marginal buyer (VQe-1 ) and the cost of the first extra-marginal 
seller (MQe+i ). The prediction for the minimum price is symmetric. 
In the limit, prices tend to keep out extra-marginal units and to keep 
in infra-marginal units. For this class of experiments the prediction 
is again that quantity traded will eventually remain in the interval 
(Qe - 1, max{Sc(p* + 1), nc(p* - l)l]. Finally, there may be an 
interval of prices any of which can be a Walrasian equilibrium with no 
units at any of these prices. If Dc(P*) sc(P*) the predictions of 
Theorem 1 are again that prices eventually remain in [P*, P*]. 
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However, it is possible to design payoff schedules with one unit at the 
Walrasian equilibrium or with no units at any Walrasian equilibrium so 
that Dc(P*) � sc(P*). This case and cases where there is no Walrasian 
equilibrium are addressed by the following theorem. 
Theorem 2: 
a) If nc(P*) > sc(P*) then there exists a day d* < ro such that 
p* s fd < P* and p* < Pd s M0c(p*) for all d � d*. 
b) If sc(P*) > Dc(P*) then there exists a day d* < ro such that 
vsc(P*) s fd < P* and p* < Pd s P* for all d � d
*. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
We prove part (a); the proof for (b) is symmetric. 
We first need to establish the relationship between P*, P*, Mo
c(P*) 
and vsc(p*). 
Claim 5: If nccp*) >seep*) then MoC(p*) > p* > vsC(p*) � P*. 
Proof of Claim 5: 
i) Suppose P* � Moc(p*). Then sc(P*) � Dc(P*). A contradiction. 
ii) Suppose V5c(P*) � p*· Then Dc(P*) � sc(P*) � S0(P*). But by 
definition, Dc(P*) + 2 s S0(P*). 
iii) Suppose p* > vS0(P*). Then Dc(P*) < sc(P*). A contradiction. 
By the argument in Theorem 1 we know that there is a day d* < ro 
such that [fj, Pj] S [P*, P*]. By Claim 5, Moc(P*) > P*. So [fj, Pj] c 
[P*, Moc(P*)J. The proof now proceeds by induction. We need to show 
that if [fd, Pd] S [ P* , M0c(P*)J then [fd+l •  Pd+ll S [P*, Moc(P*l]. 
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There are two cases to consider: ( 1 )  Pd :5 P*, and (2) Pd > P*. 
Case 1 :  Pd :$ P*. As Moc(P*) > P* �Pd and vsC(p*) � p* by Claim 5 ,
a n  argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1 shows that Pd+l :5 Moc(P*) 
and fd+l � P*. 
Case 2: Pd > P*. We know that fd < P* for all d �ct*, so Pd > P* 
implies that �pd > 1 .  So by Lemma 3 ,  ud+l :5 ud. By definition ud -
Max{Pd, MoD(�d)) and by hypothesis fd � P*. So DD(fd) :5 DD(p*). Thus, 
Moo (�d) :5 M°o (P*) :$ Moc (P*). By hypothesis Pd :5 Moc (P*). So ud :5 
Moc(P*). By definition ud+l - Max{Pd+l, M00<�d+1)). Now ud+l :5 ud :5 
Moc (P*). So Pd+l :5 Moc (P*). 
We also need to show that fd+l � P*. Suppose not. Then fd+l < 
P*. This requires so (fd) > Dc (fd). Thus, sc (P*) � so (P*) � so (fd) > 
Dc(fd) � Dc(P*). This contradicts Dc(P*) > sc(P*). So fd+l � P*. 
Theorem 2 now follows from the induction argument above and Lemma 1. 
Although Lemmas 1 ,  2, and 3 imply that prices are eventually 
contained in the interval [P*, P*] they need not stay in this interval 
if supply and demand are not equal there. For example, if Dc(P*) > 
sc(P*) and low value buyers (those with p* - 1 :5 vi < P*) trade first, 
the remaining high value buyers may bid prices up. However, they need 
not and so will not, bid more than Moc(p*) in order to complete a trade. 
So the range of prices could expand to be [P*, Moc(p*)]. In subsequent 
days it will shrink until it is again contained in [P*, P*]. It seems 
unlikely that this process would continue, and our theory does not 
predict that it will, only that it might. In fact Lemma 3 implies that 
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for all supply and demand configurations if all extra -marginal units 
are excluded by [fd• Pd] then the interval will shrink to at most one 
cent and then remain fixed. 
6. COMPARISONS OF THE PREDICTIONS WITH THE DATA 
Our prediction of convergence seems consistent with the 
experimental data, but it is not directly testable with these data as 
the number of repetitions necessary for convergence is not specified. 
In any case, obtaining the competitive equilibirum in the limit is only 
a first test of a theory of price formation in Double Oral Auctions. 
We have rejected the models considered in section 3 ,  at least in part, 
on the basis of their incorrect predictions about dynamics. In this 
section we compare the predictions of our model with experimental 
data. There are three categories of data for which our theory has 
implications: the sequence of minimum and maximum prices, the sequence 
of trading partners, and the number of units traded. 
The three lemmas in section 5 directly yield predictions about the 
dynamics of minimum and maximum prices. Lemma 1 implies that prices 
move to bracket the competitive equilibrium price and that once this is 
accomplished the equilibrium price remains in the interval [f, P]. 
Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that minimum and maximum prices respond to the 
forces of demand and supply. The prediction is that the minimum price 
will rise if demand at P exceeds supply at P and that the maximum price 
will fall if supply at P exceeds demand at P. In the excess demand 
case (D0(f) � S0(P)) the maximum price may rise, but the prediction is 
that it will go no higher than the level necessary to allow the D0(f)th 
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unit to trade (MD0(�)). For the excess supply case the prediction is
that although the minimum price may fall it will not go below vs0(P). 
Prediction 1:  Prices 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
If fd '.2: P* then !'.d+1 < !'.cl. 
- * - -If Pd s P then Pd+l >Pd. 
If fd < P* then !'.d+l < P*. 
- * - * If Pd > P then Pd+l > P . 
If 6Pd > 1 and D0(fd) '.2: S0(Pd) then fd+1 > fd and Pd+l s ud. 
If 6Pd > 1 and S0(Pd) '.2: D0(fd) then Pd+l <Pd and !'.d+1 '.2: id. 
Our prediction about the sequence of trading partners follows from 
the proofs of the Lemmas. It is essentially that sellers below P trade 
before those above P and buyers above!'. trade before those below P. 
Prediction 2: Trading Sequence 
i) If 6Pd > 1 :
All Mj < pd trade before any Mj '.2: pd. 
All Vi > !'.d trade before any vi 5 !'.d. 
ii) If 6Pd s 1 :
All Mj 5 pd trade before any Mj > pd. 
All Vi '.2: !'.cl trade before any vi < !'.d. 
Our prediction about the number of units traded is that it will be 
at least the competitive equilibrium for demand and supply curves 
truncated at P and f, respectively, 
Prediction 3 :  Quantity Traded 
less one unit. 
The quantity traded in day d will be Qd '.2: Max{K 
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V� '.2: M� } - 1 where 
V� = Min{fd, VK} for K = 1 ,  . . .  , n and 
11� Max {fd, MK} for K = 1 ,  . . . , m. 
The following table summarizes violations of our predictions about 
prices, sequence of trades, and number of units traded as a percentage 
of total possible violations for nine DOA experiments. This table is 
based on data from Williams [ 14] , and on unpublished data which were 
made available by Vernon Smith. 
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Experiment Exp Marg Com Units Qe NYSE Que Price Seq Quant 
IPDA8 No 1 5 8 6 Yes No 13 . 9 0 1 1 . 1  
I PDA9 No 1 5 8 6 Yes No 9 . 4  1 .  6 0 
I PDAlO Yes 1 5 10 8 , 6  Yes No 6 . 3  0 0 
IPDAll No 1 5 10 8 Yes No 18 . 8 1 .  3 0 
I PDD14 Yes 1 5 8 6 Yes No 9 . 4 0 0 
I I PDA14 No 3 10 21  1 5  Yes No 12 . 5 0 0 
I IPDA2 2 No 0 10 16 , ll 11 No No 3 . 1 NA 12 . 5
I I PDA2 5  Yes 2 10 12 7 No Yes 21 . 9 0 . 8  12 . 5  
I IPDA57 No 3 10 21 15  Yes Yes 16 . 7 1 . 0  8 . 3  
Average 12 . 7 0 . 7 5 . 3  
Exp = experienced subjects (have participated in another PDA) 
Marg - number of marginal units 
Com - commiss ion in cents 
Units  - number of units on each side of the market 
Qe = competi tive equilibrium quantity 
NYSE New York S tock Exchange rules (new bids and offers mus t improve 
on outstanding bids and offers)  
Que - electronic queuing of bids and o ffers ( see Smith and Will iams 
[ 13 ] )
Price % violation of price predictions 
Seq = % violation of trading sequence predict ions 
Quant % violation of quantity traded predictions 
Jable 1: VIOLATION PERCENTAGES 
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To see the total number of price violations in perspec tive , the 
following table illustrates the. margins of error . This table reports 
the total number of violations of our price predict ions (over all nine 
experiments )  which were more than x cents , as a percentage of the to tal 
number of poss ible violations of our price predictions . 
Price violations of x¢ 
or less not counted: 
x 1 
x 5 
Percentage of price violat ions 
over eight DOAs: 
6 . 3  
3 . 3  
x = 10 1 . 3  
Table 2 :  Price Violations 
To put sequence and quantity violat ions in context it is use ful to 
compare them with the violations of the sequence and quantity 
predictions of the Marshallian theory and the sequence predict ions o f  
the game theory approach . The Marshall ian theory predicts that units 
will trade in the order of value and that all profitable trades will 
occur . The violations of this prediction as a percentage of possible 
violations in I PDA8 is 42 . 5 %.  The game theory approach (Wilson [15 ] )
predicts that units wi l l  trade in the order of value but yields no 
further predict ion on the number of trades . The vio lat ions of th is  
prediction as a percentage of possible violations in IPDA8 is 29 . 4% .  
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7. FURTHER EXPERIMENTS
There is now a role for further interaction between theory and
experiments . The c lass of experiments described in Section 6 motivated 
our theory , and it in turn suggests several experiments which could 
lead to refinements or reje ction of the theory . There are several 
aspects of our theory which could be tested . Firs t ,  we do not assume 
that traders' reservation p rices and b ids or o ffers converge to their 
true values at the end of each day . The data that we have seems to 
reject such an assumption .  However , without thi s  assumption we can 
estab l ish convergence only to an interval determined by P* and P* . Our
theory admits as an equilibrium a s i tuation in which one extra -marginal 
unit is included or in which one infra- marginal unit is excluded . For 
example , Theorem 1 appl ies to the demand and supply configuration in 
Figure 1 of Appendix C to predict equilibrium in the interval [11 4 ,  
1 48). The placement o f  the first extra - marginal units in that figure 
has no effect on our equilibrium prediction . Charles Plott and Chris 
Worrell have run a DOA experiment using the configuration of Figure 1 .  
The ir data suggest that prices converge into the interval (13 3 ,  1 3 9 )  
determined b y  the first extra -marginal units . Thi s  conclusion i s  
cons is tent with our theory , but it  does sugges t  that the theory might 
be refined to produce sharper convergence results . 
Second , we have refrained from plac ing any direct assumption on the 
relative (between agent) rankings of true values and reservation 
prices . Poss ible ranking hypotheses on buyers reservation prices 
include ( 1 )  if vi > Vj then r�( t )  > r� ( t ) , and ( 2 )  if  vi >Pd and Vi � 
fd then r� ( t )  > r�( t ) . Hypothesis 1 is clearly rejected by the data , 
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but whether hypothes i s  2 is rejected depends on one ' s  s tandard of 
acceptance . The absence of a ranking hypothes i s  is responsible for the 
relat ively weak prediction of Theorem 2 .  In DOAs where Dc ( P* ) � sc ( P* ) 
our theory predicts convergence into the interval [P* , P* ] ,  but it then 
admits the poss ib i l i ty of cyc les between prices in this interval and 
prices as low as vsc(P*) if sc ( P* ) > nc ( P* ) or prices as high as 
Moc ( P*) i f  nc ( P*) > sc ( P*) . In the presence of e i ther ranking 
hypothesis ( and a symmetric hypothesis on sellers' reservation prices) 
cycles would not occur and prices would remain in [ P* , P* ] .  We have 
some data about experiments where our theory admi ts the possibil ity of 
cycles . In both IPDA8 and IPDA9 ( reported in Sect ion 6 ) , sc ( P* ) > 
Dc ( P*) .  In ne ither o f  these experiments do we see cycles , prices s eem 
to remain approximately in [P* , P* ] .  However ,  the extra -marginal
se ller unit at P* - 1 is occasionally traded,  so it is poss ible that 
cycles would have ari s en had the experiments continued beyond ten 
days . 9 This suggests two possible further experiments . First , IPDA8
could be run for more days to decide whether cyc les will appear . 
Second , an experiment with a des ign more iikely to produce cycles could 
be run . The supply and demand configuration of Figure 2 in Appendix C 
is such a des ign . The prediction of Theorem 2 for this configuration 
is that prices will remain in the interval rvsC(p*)] � (70, 101]. Our
conjecture is that in the experiments any cycles would eventually 
disappear , with prices remaining in [P* , P* ] and perhaps following a 
time path during each day starting at P* , and then ris ing during the 
day . By offering a small discount ( to P*) early in the trading day ,
infra-marginal sellers c ould insure that they complete a trade . Prices 
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would then rise by one or two cents as marginal traders complete the ir 
trades . I f  this occurs i t  suggests that the theory might be further 
refine d .  
There are several other experiments which could lead t o  refinements 
or rej ec t ion of our theory . Firs t ,  our theory is s i lent about the fine 
detai l s  of organizing a DOA . All that counts is that traders can make 
bids or offers and acceptances , and that they are informed of o thers ' 
bids , o ffers and acceptances . Thus the predictions of the theory are 
unchanged by the use of New York S tock Exchange rules , electronic 
queues ,  or other details . However , the data are not unchanged by these 
detai l s  ( see Smith and Will iams ( 13 ] ) .  I t  may be that sharper 
predictions would result if these details were taken into account . 
Second , the theory does not apply to experiments in which one s ide of 
the market is not allowed to bid or offer . See Plott and Smith [ 8 ]  for 
some experiments .  I t  would be easy , however ,  to modify the theory and 
to compare its predictions to the outcome of such experiments . Third,  
the theory does not yield predictions about the affect of shifts in 
supply and demand curves . 1 D There is now data from experiments in 
which supply and demand curves are shifted systemmatically . The theory 
would need to be refined to yield useful predictions about the effect 
o f  such changes in market conditions . 
The methodology of us ing experiments to test the predict ions of 
theory can also be applied to the alternat ive theories that we have 
describe d .  For instance , Wilson ' s  game theoretic model o f  DOAs does 
not direc tly apply to the existing DOA experiments , but a DOA 
exper iment could be des igned to te s t  the theory . Trader ' s  values and 
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costs  could be drawn independently across days from distributions which 
the traders know , risk atti tudes could be controlled for as in Roth and 
Malouf [ 9 ]  and the experiment could be repeated for a number of days to 
allow for learning about the game and about s trategies . Wilson ' s  
predic t ions could then be compared to data from the final day o f  the 
experiment . 
8 .  CONCLUS ION 
The theory presented here is deterministic and , although it doe s  
not completely describe precise paths o f  bids , offers and contrac t s , it 
does p lace fairly tight bounds on these data . One observation no t in 
accord with these bounds is grounds for rej ection of the theory , and in 
fact there are a number of such observations . However ,  the percentage 
of observations which violate the crucial impl ications of the theory is
amaz ingly low . 
The potential importance of this theory is not j ust  that i t  s eems 
to descr ibe what happens in DOA experiments , but also that it  i s  the 
beginning of a pos itive theory of how market prices are formed and o f  
how they adj ust t o  changes i n  demand and supply conditions . The 
ques t ion of price formation has a long his tory of ad hoc and 
unsuccessful attempts at an answer . Our theory is also ad hoc in the 
sense that we make assumptions on individual behavior which are no t 
derived from an optimiz ing model . However ,  our assumptions seem 
sensible and , more important , they seem to do a reas onable j ob of 
de scrib ing actual b ids , offers , and contracts . There is now a targe t 
for experimentalists to rej ect with data or for theorists to improve on 
3 6  
by obtaining a better f i t  with the data or a better explanation of 
observed behavio r .  
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APPENDIX A 
Induced Demand- Supply Schedule 
DOA #IPDA14 ( 10/18/ 7 7 )  
Week 1 
s 
D 
L-�-+��1--�-+��+-�-+��t-�-+��+-������- Quan t i t y
2 3 4 5 6 8 
The number indicates the holder of the unit with that value or cos t .  
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APPENDIX B 
The following informat ion is provided for a typ ical des ign : 
1 .  Ins tructions from the standard DOA experiments run without the aid 
of  a computer . 
2 .  The values , V; , and costs , Mj , from a Plato computer - as s isted 
experiment IPDA14 run on 10/18/77 at the University of Arizona (a 
week i s  five days ) .
3 .  The record sheets of Buyer 4 and Seller 1 from IPDA14 . 
4 .  The data saved by the computer for Day 9 (MKR - maker o f  b id or 
offe r ,  TM time left in day in seconds , TKR - acceptor of that b id 
or affe r ,  a "* " in the TKR column indicates that b id or offer 
occured before the acceptance) . 
5 .  A l is t  of contrac ts in the order agreed to each day including 
price , buyer , and seller . 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
General 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decis ion making . 
Various research foundations have provided funds for this research . 
The instructions are s imple and if you follow them carefully and make 
good dec is ions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will 
be paid to you in cash . 
In thi s  experiment we are going to s imulate a market in which some of  
you will be buyers and some of you will be  sellers in a sequence o f  
market days o r  trading periods . Attached t o  the instructions you w i l l  
find a sheet , labeled Buyer o r  Seller , which describes the value t o  you 
of any dec is ions you might make . You are not to reveal this 
information to anyone . It is your own private information . 
Specific Instruc tions to Buyers 
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or 
sellers as many units as you might want . For the first unit that you 
buy during a trading period you will rece ive the amount listed in row 1 
marked 1st  uni t  redemption value ; if you buy a second unit you w i l l  
rece ive the addi t ional amount listed in row 5 marked 2nd unit 
redemption value . The profits from each purchase (which are yours to  
keep ) are computed by taking the difference between the redemption 
value and purchase price of the unit bought . Under no condi tions may 
you buy a unit for a price which exceeds the redemption value . I n  
addition to thi s  profit you w i l l  receive a five cent commiss ion for 
each purchase .  That is 
[ your earnings - ( redemption value) - (purchase price) + . 0 5 ]  
Suppos e , for example , that you buy two units and that your redemp t ion 
value for the first unit is $200 and for the second unit  is $ 1 8 0 . I f  
you pay $150  for your first uni t  and $160 for the second uni t ,  your 
earnings are : 
$ earnings from 1 s t  200 150 + . 05 50 . 05 
$ earnings from 2nd 180 160 + . 05 20 . 05 
total % earnings 50 . 05 + 20 . 0 5 70 . 10 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profi ts . 
purchase price of the first unit you buy during the first 
be recorded on row 2 at the time of purchase . You should 
the profits on th is purchase as directed on rows 3 and 4 .  
of the per iod record the total of profits and commiss ions 
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The 
period should 
then re cord 
At the end 
on the last
row , 9 ,  of the page . Subsequent periods should be recorded s imilarly . 
Specific Ins truc tions to Sellers 
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buye rs 
as many units as you might want . The first unit that you sell during a 
trading period you obtain at a cost of the amount listed on the 
attached sheet in the row , 2 ,  marked cost of 1st uni t ;  if you sell a 
second unit you incur the cost l is ted in the row , 6 ,  marked cost of the 
2nd uni t .  The profits from each sale (which are yours t o  keep ) are 
computed by taking the difference between the price at which you sold 
the unit and the cost of the uni t .  Under no condit ions may you sell a 
unit at a price be low the cost of the uni t .  I n  addition to this profit 
you will receive a five cent commiss ion for each sale . That is 
[ your earnings - ( sale price of uni t )  - ( cost o f  unit)  + . 05 ]  
Your total profits and commissions for a trading period , which are 
yours to keep , are computed by adding up the profit  and commiss ions on 
sales made during the trading period . 
Suppos e ,  for example , your cost of the 1st  uni t  is $ 140 and your cost 
of the second unit is $160 . I f  you sell the first unit at $200 and the 
second unit at $ 190 , your earnings are 
$ earnings from 1st  200  140 + . 05 60 . 05 
$ earnings from 2nd 190 - 160 + . 05 3 0 . 05 
total $ earnings 60 . 05 + 30 . 05 90 . 10 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits . The sale 
price of the first unit you sell during the 1st  period should be 
recorded on row 1 at the time of sale . You should then record the 
profits on thi s  sale as directed on rows 3 and 4 .  At the end o f  the 
period record the total of profits and commis s ions on the last row , 9 ,  
of the page . Subsequent periods should be recorded s imilarly . 
Market Organizations 
The market for this commodity is organized as follows . We open the 
market for a trading per iod (a trading " day" ) .  You will be warned when 
the end of the trading period is approaching . Any buyer (or seller) is 
free at any t ime during the period , to raise his hand and make a verbal 
bid (offer)  to buy one unit of the commodity at a specified price . Any 
seller ( o r  buyer )  is free to accept or no t accept the bid of any buyer 
( or seller ) . I f  a b i d  is accepted a b inding contract has been closed 
for a s ingle uni t  and the buyer and seller will record the contract 
price to be included in the ir earnings . Any ties in bids or 
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acceptances will be resolved by a random choice of buyer or seller . 
Except for the b ids and the ir acceptance you are not to speak to any 
other subj ect .  There are l ikely to be many b ids that are not accepte d ,  
but you are free t o  keep trying , and a s  a buyer o r  seller you are free 
to make as much profit as you can .  
Are there any ques t ions ? 
1,2 
Week 1 Week 2 
Uni t  1 Unit 2 Uni t  1 Unit 2 
BYR 1 5 . 2 0 3 . 8 0 3 . 7 0 3 . 6 0 
BYR 2 5 . 00 4 . 00 3 . 8 0 3 . 5 0 
BYR 3 4 . 8 0 4 .  2 0  3 . 9 0 3 . 40 
BYR 4 4 . 6 0 4 . 40 4 . 00 3 . 3 0 
SLR 1 3 . 70 4 . 40 3 . 10 3 . 3 0 
SLR 2 3 . 8 0 4 . 3 0 2 . 9 0 3 . 50 
SLR 3 3 . 9 0 4 . 2 0 2 . 7 0 3 . 7 0 
SLR 4 4 . 00 4 . 10 2 . 5 0 3 . 9 0 
Touch the parame ter to be changed .  
BACK for last page ; BACKl t o  replot thi s  page ; 
LAB for moni tor ; DATA to update spec i f i c  vc 
HELPl for Week 2 D - sh i f t ; 
HELP to shi f t  back to o r iginal 
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_!_rad t nll l't> r i od 
I l i; t  Un i t  
--�s a l e  Va l u e
2 Pu rc hase 
P r i ce 
) P r o f  l t 
· -
( r o w  I - row 2 )  >---
1, Pro f l l  + S . 05 
Comm i s s ion 
5 2nd Un i t  
Wt• s a l e  Va lue 
b Pur chase 
P r i ce 
7 l'rof l t 
( row 5 - row b )  
ll l'rol I t  + � .  ll'.> 
Commi s s i on 
'J Tot a l  l'r o l i l  
( r ow 4 + row H) 
I 
4 .  6U 
4. Lil
o. 40
0 . 1  • ., 
4 .  40 
4 . 40 
U . OIJ 
0 . 115 
1 1 . )1 1  
2 ----
- -
'• . h(J 
1 • .  1 11
0. JO
o .  15
4 . 40 
4 .  JO 
1 1 .  I U  
l l .  1 5  
1 1 . )ll 
Record Sheet for Buyer 4 
1 4 5 6 
4 . 6() 1 • •  60 4 . 60 4 . 00 
4 . 2 5 4 .  JO 4 . JO J . 35 
0 . 3 5 0. 30 0. 30 0 . 6 5  
l l .  4 0  o .  35 0 . 35 0. 70 
4 . 40 4 . 40 4 . 40 J . JO 
4 . 30 4 . 30 4 . 2 5  
U .  IO 0. 1 0  0. 1 5  
U . 1 5 0. 1 5 0 . 20 o . oo 
U . 5 5  0. 50 0 . 55 0 . 70 
Su bj e c t : ott 
P r o f i t : pe r i ods 1 - 5 • S 2 . 60 
pe r i od s  6 - 10 • S 2 . 60 
TOTAL PROFIT a S 5. 20 
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7 
4 . 00 
o . oo 
J . JO 
o.oo
o . oo 
8 9 1 0  
4 . 00 4 . 00 4 . 00 
J . 40 J . 40 3 . 4 5  
0 . 60 0 . 60 0. 55 
0 . 6 5  0 . 6 5  0 . 60 
J . JO J. 30 J. JO 
o.oo o. oo o . uo
0 . 65 0.65 0 . 60 
Expe r lment f i n  I i;hed : I 0/ I 8 /  1 7  
Trad l nl( Pt!r iod I 2 
I Se l l i ng Price 
of lt>t Uni t  4 . 20 4 .  3'> 
2 Cos t of 1 .. t 
Un i t  3 . 70 3. 7 0
3 Prof i t  
( row l - row 2 )  0 . 50 0 . 6 5  
4 P ro f i t  + � . O'> 
Co1umi li s i on o. '>5 o. 70 
5 Se l l i ng Price 
of 2nd Uni t 
6 Cos t  of lnd 
Uni t  4 . 40 4 . 40 
7 Prof i t  
( row 5 - row 6 )  
8 Prof i t  + $ .  05 
Co1U111iss ion 0 . 00 o . uu 
9 'fol al Prof i t  
( row 4 + row ll )  l l .  ') ')  U . 7 0 
Record Sheet for Se l ler 1 
j 4 5 6 
4 . 2 5 4 . 30 4 .  30 3 . 3 5 
3. 70 3 . 7 0 3 . 70 3 . 10 
u .  5 '>  0.60 0 . 60 0 . 25 
0 . 60 0 . 6 5  0 . 65 0 . 30 
3 . 32 
4 . 40 4 . 4U 4 . 40 3. 30 
0 . 02 
o . oo u . oo 0 . 00  0 . 07 
I I .  hll U . 6 5 0 . 6 5  o. 3 7
Subj ect : aiecham 
l'tot i t : · · ·· - 41 - ..11 - I _ C:. pct. .A.UUD I. - J - c 'l I C-.. - ., J• & J  
l.'e rlods 6 - 1 0  = S 2. 5 l  
'l'U'l'AL l'KU.'l 'l' - � '> . t>tl 
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7 
3. j �  
3 .  I ll 
0 . 1 5  
o .  ·w 
3 . Jll 
3 . JO 
O . Oll 
0 . 1 j 
o. 4 1
ll - ------
3 . 40 
3 . 10 
0 . 30 
o. 35 
J . 40 
3 . 30 
0 . 1 0  
o. 1 5
o. �()
9 I l l  
3 . 4 "1 ·1 . 4 '>
3 . 1 0 J. 1 0  
0 . 33 0 . 3 5 
0 . 311 o . 4u 
3 . 4 5 3 . 50 
3 . 30 J . JO 
0 . 1 5  0 . 20 
0 . 20 0 . 2 5  
O. 'ill l l . b ') 
E x p c r l 111c 1 1 t  f l u l ,, lied : 1 0 / l tl / 7  / 
PERIOD 9 
MKR TM BIDS OFFERS TKR TM 
1 B2 2 9 7  3 . 3 0 
2 B l  2 9 5  3 . 34 
3 B 2  2 9 2  3 . 3 5 
4 S4 2 8 9  3 . 4 5 B 3  2 8 5  
5 B2 2 8 1  3 . 30 
6 B4 2 7 8  3 . 3 5 
7 B 2  2 7 5  3 . 3 6 
8 S 3  2 7 4  3 . 5 0 
9 Bl 2 6 8  3 . 3 9 
1 0  B4 2 5 8  3 . 40 S 2  2 5 2  
1 1  S l  2 54 3 . 45 * 
1 2  B2 247 3 . 3 0 
1 3  B l  2 4 5  3 . 40 
14 S 3  2 4 4  3 . 50 
1 5  S l  2 3 6  3 . 4 5 
1 6  B2 2 3 1  3 . 41 
1 7  S 3  1 9 1  3 . 44 
1 8  S l  1 8 1  3 . 4 3 B 2  154 
19 B4 1 5 1  3 . 3 0 
2 0  B 2  147 3 . 3 1 
2 1  S 2  146 4 . 50 
2 2  Bl 146 3 . 40 
2 3  B2 140 3 . 41 
2 4  S l  1 3 6  3 . 45 B l  6 8  
2 5  B2 1 2 2  3 . 4 2 * 
2 6  B l  1 1 2  3 . 4 3 * 
2 7  B 2  1 0 6  3 . 44 * 
2 8  S 2  6 3  4 . 5 0 
2 9  B4 6 2  3 . 3 0 
3 0  B l  6 1  3 . 40 
3 1  S 3  5 7  3 . 49 
3 2  B2 55 3 . 4 1 
3 3  Bl 45 3 . 4 3 
3 4  B 2  4 1  3 . 44 
3 5  B2 2 3  3 . 45 S 3  1 7  
3 6  B4 1 1  3 . 3 0 
3 7  S 2  1 0  3 . 50 B l  0 
3 8  B l  8 3 . 40 * 
4 6  
SUMMARY DATA FROM IPDA14 Day 8 3 . 40 4 2 
3 . 40 1 1 
3 . 40 1 1 
3 . 40 3 4 
Contract Price Buyer Seller 3 . 40 2 3 
Day 1 4 . 2 5 2 3 Day 9 3 . 45 3 4 
4 . 20 4 1 3 . 40 4 2 
4 . 50 3 2 3 . 43 2 1 
4 . 40 4 4 3 . 45 1 1 
4 . 30 1 2 3 . 45 2 3 
3 . 50 1 2 
Day 2 4 . 3 5 3 1 
4 . 30 4 2 Day 10 3 . 41 2 2 
4 . 30 4 2 3 . 44 1 4 
4 . 30 1 4 3 . 45 4 1 
4 . 2 5 2 4 3 . 45 1 3 
3 . 50 3 1 
Day 3 4 . 25 4 1 
4 . 35 3 3 
4 .  30 4 2 
4 . 27 2 4 
4 . 25 1 3 
Day 4 4 . 30 4 1 
4 . 39 3 4 
4 . 30 4 4 
4 . 26 2 2 
4 . 2 5 1 3 
4 . 20 3 2 
Day 5 4 . 30 4 1 
4 . 26 2 2 
4 . 35 3 4 
4 . 26 1 3 
4 . 2 5 4 4 
Day 6 3 . 35 4 1 
3 . 30 3 2 
3 . 3 5 3 3 
3 . 3 2 2 1 
3 . 35 1 4 
Day 7 3 . 3 1 2 2 
3 . 3 5 3 1 
3 . 40 3 4 
3 . 3 8 2 1 
3 . 45 1 3 
47 48  
Price 
147 
139 
133 
115 
APPENDIX C 
Supply and Demand Schedules for Further Experiments 
6 
8 
6 
9 
1 
Figure 1 
· o  
Quantity 
( From unpublished experiment by Charles Plott and Chris Worrel l )  
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Price 
100 
70 
6 - - - - - - - - �--..-----,----------' 
3 4 
( P* 
5 7 8 
8 
10 
- - - - - - - - - - - , 10 
Figure 2 
101, p* - 99 , vs c (P *) - 70)
50 
s 
D 
Quantity 
FOOTNOTES 
* This paper benefited from discus s ions in seminars at Corne l l , 
Northwes tern ,  S tonybrook , and an NSF Conference on Experimental
Economics at the Univers i ty of Arizona . This version is
s ignificantly different from earlier versions . We would l ike to 
thank Vernon Smith and Arl ington Will iams for making data on their
Plata DOA experiments available to us . 
1 .  These markets  are described in detail in Appendix B .  I n  fac t some 
of the auctions are computerized rather than oral . All that 
matters is that partic ipants can make b i ds or offers and 
acceptances , and are informed of others ' b ids or offers and 
acceptances . 
2 .  Other des i gns are also use d .  S e e  Smith [ 10 ]  for some of these . 
3 .  See Smith and Will iams [ 1 3 )  for a description of the usual results . 
4 .  Each partic ipant also observes the timing o f  each contract ,  bid , 
and offer . It is highly probable that the t iming of these events 
is an important piece of informat ion which affects the actions of 
the buyers and sellers . However ,  the level of complexity required 
to incorporate t iming into the model seems to outweigh the gains 
to be achieved.  Thus , we  ignore i t  throughout the paper . 
5 1  
5 .  A more sophisticated theory might distinguish between the amount a 
buyer is will ing to bid and the lowest offer he would accept . In 
particular , buyers may not be willing to bid up to the ir 
reservation price (see Wilson ( 15 ] ) .  This distinction could be 
easily incorporated into our mode l ,  but it  is not clear how it 
would add to the explanatory power of the model . 
6 .  Holt , Langan and Villamil ( 4 )  report a series of experiments in 
which traders had multiple units with payoffs structured to give 
some traders market power . Their data are nonethe less reasonably 
cons i s tent with the predictions of our theory . So our implicit  
assumption that traders decide on strategies for each unit 
separately seems not to be at odds with the facts . 
7 .  We make no direct assumptions about the relative rankings of true 
values and reservation prioes . In our model an individual can 
determine his reservation price us ing only his own value and past 
b i ds , offers and contracts . 
8 .  Our model yields no predictions for day 1 of any experiment . In 
any experiment in which supply or demand was shifted we treat the 
first day after the shift as day 1 of a new exper iment . In e ach 
non- initial day o f  an experiment we have four possible violations 
of price predictions : violations of l ( i ) , l ( i i)  and the two 
predictions of e i ther l ( ii i )  or l ( iv) . So , in an experiment 
running for ten days with no shifts there are 36 possible price
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violations . The entry for price violations is the nwnber of 
violations divided by the nwnber of poss ible violations . In each 
non- initial day the nwnber of poss ible trading sequence violations 
is the nwnber of buyer plus seller units (n + m) . The nwnber of 
actual violations is the nwnber of units  traded out of order . In 
each non- init ial day there is one quanti ty predic t ion ,  and thus 
one possible quantity violation . 
9 .  In I PDA8 the extra-marginal unit at P* - 1 is seller 2 ' s  second 
uni t .  This uni t  is  traded in both days 9 and 10  o f  the experiment . 
10 . For experiments in which shifts occur we have treated the day of 
the shift as day 1 o f  a new experiment . 
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